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Local Taxes, Federal Courts, and School Desegregation in ·the 
Proposition 13 Era · 
In the twenty-five years since Brown v. Board ef Education, 1 
school desegregation has propelled America into its frenetic modem 
phase in race relations.2 With varying success, the federal judiciary 
has committed itself to termir1.ating that discrimination which affects 
segregated children's "hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone."3 That commitment to school integration has carried with 
it significant social costs, including strong and unbowed community 
resistance,4 inconvenience and hardship for students, substantial 
public expenditures, and flight by white residents from the desegre-
gated school district, sometimes resulting in an even more pro-
nounced racial imbalance.5 Indeed, influential social scientists have 
questioned whether the benefits of most desegregation methods out-
weigh these costs.6 Other commentators have suggested that, even 
disregarding costs, the achievement of racial balance in the schools is 
not the most effective way to improve black children's education.7 
Nevertheless, propelled by the Supreme Court's mandate to termi-
l. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brown I]. 
2. See Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of 
Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (1975). 
3. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. But see Hawley & Rist, On the Future Implementation of 
School Desegregation: Some Considerations, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 412 (1975). 
4. See Comment, Community Resistance lo School Desegregation: Enjoining the Undefina-
ble Class, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (1976); Hain, Techniques of Governmental Reorganization To 
Achieve School Desegregation, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 779,808 (1975); Read, supra note 2. For an 
extensive study of one community's response to desegregation, see W. RECORD & J. RECORD, · 
LITTLE ROCK, U.S.A. (1960). 
5. See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229,264 (S.D. Ohio), qffd. in part, 
583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), qffd., 443 U.S. 449 (1979). The costs of desegregation orders that 
include receiverships and similar pervasive management of the school system can grow partic-
ularly large. Comment, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neoreceiver-
ships to Implement Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 1161, 1198. 
6. See Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 194 (1975). Dr. 
James Coleman, whose 1966 study provided a principal motivation for extensive busing, J. 
COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J. MCPARTLAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFIELD & R. YORK, 
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966), has since argued that busing has been 
largely counterproductive as it has been handled thus far. See Scholar Eases Criticism of Study 
of White Flight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1976, § D, at 14, col. l. But see Rodgers, The Supreme 
Court and School Desegregation: Twenty Years Later, 89 POL. Sci. Q. 751, 775-76 (1974); 
Symposium on Completing the Job of School Desegregation, 19 How. L.J. l (1975). See gener-
ally EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (Harvard Educational Rev. ed. 1969); ON EQUAL-
ITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan ed. 1972). 
7. See Bickel, Education in a Democracy: The Legal and Practical Problems of School Busi-
ness, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 54 (1973). But see United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 
380 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). 
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nate segregated schooling, federal district courts continue their de-
segregation efforts. 
A recent trend in state referenda and legislation promises to 
make those efforts even more difficult. Tax limitation provisions -
whether in the form of constitutional restraints on state or local tax-
ing authority such as California's highly publicized Proposition 138 
or legislatively imposed ceilings on local taxing authority9 - may 
significantly restrict the ability of a state or local government to raise 
money. 10 This Note examines a federal court's dilemma when the 
remedy of sqhool desegregation collides with the trend of tax limita-
tion - when a school desegregation order requires funds that the 
local school authorities do not have and cannot raise. Can the dis-
trict court order a local tax levy to fund school desegregation when 
the school authorities have already reached their maximum taxing 
limit? Is there a better alternative remedy? 
To tackle those questions, this Note first elucidates three equita-
ble principles to guide courts in fashioning desegregation decrees. It 
then explores the history of judicial power to order state and local 
governments to levy taxes and finds that power tightly circum-
scribed. In Section III, the Note offers an alternative to the court-
ordered tax levy: a decree that directs local school authorities to de-
segregate, letting them decide whether to fund the desegregation by 
raising taxes or by reallocating their present budget. It assesses this 
proposal in light of the three equitable principles of desegregation 
and concludes that the proposal carries out those principles more 
faithfully than a court-ordered tax levy. 
I. PRINCIPLES FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION REMEDIES 
In Milliken v. Bradley, 11 the Supreme Court summarized its ear-
lier holdings and presented relatively specific guidelines for school 
desegregation orders. The opinion, as further defined in more recent 
cases, identifies three basic equitable principles to guide the forma-
tion of a decree. First, the remedy "must be designed as nearly as 
possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the posi-
tion they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.' " 12 
Federal courts have been surprisingly bold in seeking such restora-
tion; the segregation cases departed from a history of judicial reluc-
8. CAL. CONST. art. )CTIIA. 
9. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.§§ 6-1.1-18, -19 (Burns 1978 & Supp. 1979). 
IO. Thirteen states passed referenda in the November 1978 election limiting the spending 
or taidng power of state and local governments. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1978, § A, at 20, col. 
5. 
11. 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Milliken II]. 
12. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Milliken I]). 
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tance to grant mandatory injunctions against government officers 
and triggered an increasing willingness to issue such decrees. 13 Ex-
panding on the traditional flexibility of equitable remedies, 14 appel-
late courts have upheld a variety of prohibitions and affirmative 
requirements in desegregation orders. 15 
The second principle for desegregation remedies, on the other 
hand, limits the permissible forms of a remedial decree: "[T]he de-
segregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of 
the constitutional violation"16 and must be directly related to the 
"condition alleged to offend the Constitution." 17 Hence, the district 
court must confine its remedy to eliminating the effects of past gov-
ernmental discrimination and not attempt the herculean labor of 
eradicating the effects of all private segregative behavior. 18 This sec-
ond principle has prompted the Supreme Court to strike down a dis-
13. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1061-62 (1965). See 
also Note, Receivership as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 115 (1969) 
(discussion of equity's development of protection for personal rights). 
14. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955). [hereinafter cited as Brown II]. 
See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY§ 23 (2d ed. 1948). 
15. Soon after Brown II, federal courts affirmed prohibitions against individuals who di-
rectly interfered with desegregation orders, including a governor who ordered out the National 
Guard, Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958), and 
a private citizen who advocated violent opposition to desegregation, Kasper v. Brittain, 245 
F.2d 92 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957). The courts also asserted equitable control 
over school system management. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 287 (1977) (remedial educa-
tional programs for black students); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 
23-25, 27-31 (1971) (racial quotas for student bodies, noncontiguous attendance districts, bus-
ing); United States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1969) (faculty and staff 
desegregation). See also Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th 
Cir. 1969). 
When confronting particularly recalcitrant local school authorities, district courts have ap-
propriately broader power to facilitate desegregation by appointing a receiver over a trouble-
some school. See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1042 (1977); Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 731-35 (S.D. Ga. 1965) (supplemental opin-
ion 1966). Moreover, in many cases where courts have issued a comprehensive decree and 
retained jurisdiction, the district judge has virtually assumed the role of a receiver. See Rob-
erts, The Extent of Federal Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South Boston High 
Schoof, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55, 74 (1976). 
16. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977). See also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 
(1976). 
17. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974). See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. I, 16 (1971). 
18. The remedies in southern desegregation cases before Milliken I stressed an affirmative 
duty on the part of school officials to desegregate completely, and courts judged each desegre-
gation plan on its success in achieving that goal. See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. 
of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 489 (1972); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972); 
North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971). Although these cases may appear to 
conflict with Milliken Fs controlling principle, at least one commentator has contended that 
they may be consistent: where the school authorities had expressly labelled schools as black or 
white, complete integration may have been necessary to reverse such stigmatization; accord-
ingly, the courts demanded complete desegregation. Kanner, From Denver to Dayton: The 
Development of a Theory of Equal Protection Remedies, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 382 n.l (1977). 
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trict court decree ordering a school system to maintain a specified 
racial balance in schools after racial discrimination through official 
action had been eliminated from the system.19 It has also led the 
Court to reject intersystem busing as a remedy where only one 
school system had been liable for constitutional violations.20 
The Supreme Court's third principle of school desegregation 
remedies requires lower courts to consider "the interests of state and 
local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the 
Constitution."21 The district court must therefore choose a remedy 
that rectifies the constitutional violation with a minimal intrusion 
upon the autonomy of state and local governments. It is this princi-
ple that makes a judge pause before ordering a tax levy. The conflict 
between a state tax ceiling and the need for expensive remedial ac-
19. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 31-32 (1971). See also 
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976). Professor Tribe quite cor-
rectly views the Spangler decision as a retreat from desegregation cases advocating broad equi-
table powers in the district courts. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-20 
(1978). · 
20. In Milliken I, the Court reversed an order requiring desegregation of 54 school districts 
in metropolitan Detroit. The district court had found only the Detroit school system to have 
treated students unequally but had included the suburban systems in the decree because deseg-
regation in the city alone would have placed only a trivial percentage of white students in each 
school, 418 U.S. 717, 735 (1974). Although such a metropolis-wide remedy might have been 
appropriate had the suburban segregation been caused by the city system's unconstitutional 
acts, see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973), the Supreme Court held that 
because the disparate treatment of black and white students occurred only within the Detroit 
school system, the remedy had to be limited to that system. 418 U.S. at 744-45. The Court was 
not prepared to use school desegregation to reverse the effects of other sources of discrimina-
tion. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 757 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 418 U.S. at 762 (White, J., 
dissenting); 418 U.S. at 781 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 
413 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
This second equitable principle even led the Court tentatively to extend Milliken I to in-
trasystem violations. In Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), the Court 
required the plaintiffs to demonstrate how much of the segregation in the school system was 
caused by unconstitutional behavior, as distinct from that segregation caused by residential 
patterns or similar extraneous factors. It then concluded that courts should remedy only those 
segregative effects stemming from particular, proven acts of discrimination rather than remedy 
all segregation within the district. Thus, the plaintiffs had to prove the marginal effect of the 
defendant's unconstitutional behavior; the remedy could correct only such marginal discrimi-
nation. Kanner, supra note 18, at 403-05. See also School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 
(1977); Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977). 
Perhaps recognizing the potentially crippling effect of this standard, the Court hedged 
somewhat and upheld systemwide remedies without closely examining the extent of the consti-
tutional violation when Dayton reappeared before the Court, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), along with a companion case, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 
U.S. 449 (1979). The two decisions may well have rested on what dissenting Justice Rehnquist 
termed a "talismanic" reliance on the trial court's use of the words "systemwide violation." 
443 U.S. at 491. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, any other outcome would either have 
greatly increased the scope of appellate review in desegregation cases or have essentially elimi-
nated school desegregation decrees through an insurmountable burden of proof. 
21. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977). This third principle necessarily entails bal-
ancing individual and public interests. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). 
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tion by a school system epitomizes the tension between principles of 
desegregation and federalism. 
II. JUDICIAL POWER To ORDER TAXATION 
The Supreme Court first raised the possibility that a federal court 
might levy a tax to pay for a remedy in Gr!ffin v. County School 
Board.22 In that case, the school board of Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, had devised a complex scheme to avoid Brown's mandate 
for desegregated schools. The county closed its public schools in 
1951, and the Board of Supervisors did not levy taxes or appropriate 
funds for schools from that time until Gr!ffin was decided in 1963. 
White parents quickly established all-white private schools, and the 
State of Virginia and Prince Edward County jointly paid tuition 
grants to those parents. Additionally, the county provided a 25 per-
cent property tax credit for contributions to the white schools. From 
1959 to 1963, there were no schools for black children in Prince Ed-
ward County. Reversing the Fourth Circuit's disposition of the 
case,23 the Supreme Court held that the schools' closing violated the 
equal protection clause. 24 A state need not treat all of its counties 
alike, but "[w]hatever nonracial grounds might support a State's al-
lowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a con-
stitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation 
do not qualify as constitutional."25 
The Court then discussed the appropriate remedy, affirming the 
district court decree: 
The injunction against paying tuition grants and giving tax credits 
while public schools remain closed is appropriate and necessary since 
those grants and tax credits have been essential parts of the county's 
program . . . to deprive petitioners of the same advantages of a public 
school education enjoyed by children in every other part of Virginia. 
For the same reasons the District Court may, if necessary to prevent 
further racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise the 
power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, 
operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school 
system in Prince Edward County like that operated in other counties in 
Virginia.26 ' 
22. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
23. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), revd. sub nom. Griffin v. 
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). The district court had ordered the reopening of the 
schools, Allen v. School Bd., 207 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Va. 1962), but the Fourth Circuit reversed 
without reaching the merits, awaiting determination of Virginia law in the state courts. The 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the entire scheme under state law. County School 
Bd. v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963). 
24. 377 U.S. at 231-32. 
25. 377 U.S. at 231 (footnote omitted). 
26. 377 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Significantly for the purpose of 
this Note, Justices Clark and Harlan disagreed with the holding that the federal courts are 
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Two aspects of Gr!ffin raise doubts, however, about whether the 
Court's strong directive to levy a tax would be repeated in the face of 
a tax ceiling limiting funds available for desegregation. First, the 
constitutional violation in Gr!ffin stemmed from the school authori-
ties' total failure to provide funds for public schools.27 The issue was 
not how big a tax the school board should levy, but whether it should 
levy a tax for schools at all.28 Second, Gr!ffin involved no statutory 
or constitutional tax limitation; the Supreme Court suggested a tax 
levy fully within the authority of the Board of Supervisors, an au-
thority that the Board had exercised until it began e.ff orts to block 
desegregation. 
This second, potentially limiting feature of Gr!ffin becomes cru-
cial if a school board lacks the power to raise taxes to fund desegre-
gation. Unfortunately, Justice Black's majority opinion in Gr!ffin 
gave no guidance in defining the judicial power to levy taxes, since it 
cited no authority for the existence of the power at all. However, 
Judge J. Spencer Bell, in his dissent to the Fourth Circuit's resolu-
tion of Gr!ffin,29 also endorsed a court-ordered tax levy, and he pro-
vided substantial precedent for that equitable remedy:30 
empowered to order the reopening of the public schools, but otherwise joined in the opinion. 
Thus, despite the constitutional violation, two Justices felt that some remedies were inappro• 
priate due to the state or locality's interest in managing their own schools. 
27. In Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969), the 
Fifth Circuit recognized this distinction. The Plaquemines Board had systematically at• 
tempted to destroy its own school system to benefit white private schools, yet had kept the 
public schools operating at a minimum level so as to avoid the Gr!ffin precedent. The court 
recalled "no record in any school which ... revealed so graphically official attempts to de-
stroy a public school system and to flout the mandates of the United States Constitution." 415 
F.2d at 835 n.29. 
The extensive district court decree ordered that the local authorities return the public 
schools to their pre-desegregation stature, and that the school board apply for federal aid from 
several specified programs. On appeal, the appellees cited Gr!ffin's tax levy directive in support 
of the decree, but the Fifth Circuit refused to accept the analogy: 
A most appealing argument can be made that if the district court has the power to 
require a county board to levy taxes for the operation of schools, it also has the power to 
require the School Board to accept proffered financial assistance from federal agen-
cies .... But [Gr!ffin] must be considered a unique case. The Prince Edward County 
schools were closed and the court directed that they be reopened and that taxes be levied 
and collected to operate them. The subjects of levy, tax rates, and collection methods 
were left to the commands of state law under state standards. Here the provision (of the 
district court order] goes beyond [Gr!ffin], as to source, manner, and controls accompany-
ing the funds .... We conclude that approval of the provision as now broadly written is 
not justified. 
415 F.2d at 833. 
The circuit court stated, however, that its reversal was without prejudice to the right of the 
district court to order the board to apply for specific funds where it had failed to apply in order 
to retard desegregation. 415 F.2d at 833. 
28. A rereading of Gr!ffin, when considered within the unique facts of the case, suggests 
this interpretation. See text at note 26 supra. 
29. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332,344 (4th Cir. 1963) (Bell, J., dissenting), 
revd sub nom. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
30. Curiously, Justice Black's opinion failed to refer to Judge Bell's discussion of the tax 
levy remedy. Arguably, its failure to mention any precedent suggests agreement with the dis-
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Neither am I impressed with the argument that the district court 
has no power to compel a levy of taxes for a monetary appropriation 
by the defendant Board of Supervisors should it fail to obey the man-
date of the district court. It should be enough to cite Virginia v. West 
Virginia.31 
Virginia v. West Virginia32 involved an indebtedness that arose 
between the two states at the time of their separation. Congress ap-
proved the terms of West Virginia's debt when it admitted the new 
state into the Union. Worried that West Virginia might never pay, 
Virginia sued its Siamese twin, requesting that the Supreme Court 
compel the state to levy a tax to pay the debt. The Court recognized 
the debt's validity, but refrained from issuing a tax levy injunction 
despite considerable dicta suggesting that such a remedy was within 
its power. The Court trusted either that West Virginia would will-
ingly comply once the Court had certified the obligation or that Con-
gress would enforce the debt because it had approved the obligation 
originally. If those methods failed, however, the Court appeared 
willing to issue an injunction compelling state taxations. As Judge 
Bell concluded in his Gr!ffen dissent, the Virginia Court was "plain in 
its implication that West Virginia could be compelled to pay if com-
pulsion were the only way to accomplish the result."33 
The Virginia court had in t_um relied heavily upon a series of-
nineteenth-century municipal bond cases.34 There the Supreme 
Court had shown little reluctance in ordering tax levies to pay hold-
ers of delinquent municipal bonds when the municipality had failed 
to exercise its full taxing power.35 However, the Court had recog.:. 
sent reaching the same conclusions. On the other hand, the Court may have wished to avoid 
any reliance upon Judge Bell's bond cases, see notes 32-40 i,!fra and accompanying text, pre-
ferring instead to rely on an amorphous equity powers rationale. 
The petitioners' brief in Gr!ffin cited James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va.), 
q(fd., 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959), as authority for a federal court 
to order a tax levy. That case, however, merely affirmed an injunction that prohibited the city 
council from withholding school funds that it had previously collected and allocated and then 
later withheld so as to avoid desegregation. See note 59 il!fra. 
The amicus brief of the United States, however, did point to the bond cases as authority for 
a decree that would levy a tax, citing, inter alia, Labette County Commrs. v. United States ex 
rel. Moulton, ll2 U.S. 217 (1884); City of Galena v. Amy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 705 (1866). Brief 
for United States at 6. 
31. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 1963) (Bell, J., dissenting), 
revd. sub nom. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
32. 246 U.S. 565 (1918). 
33. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d at 347 (Bell, J., dissenting), revd. sub nom. 
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
34. Judge Bell also cited them in his Griffin dissent, 322 F.2d at 347. Although some of the 
bond cases involved bonds issued for capital improvements or judgments against municipali-
ties, the majority of these cases arose from railroad bonds. State statutes had incorporated 
railroad companies within each state, authorizing the state's political subdivisions to invest in 
the railroad stock and issue bonds in order to pay for the stock. The municipal investment was 
necessary to provide sufficient capital for the railroads. 
35. E.g., Labette County Commrs. v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217 (1884); 
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nized two substantial limitations on its authority to order taxation. 
First, the local government could only be compelled to levy taxes to 
the extent permitted by state law.36 Since the local government was 
a creature of state law, that law circumscribed the local government's 
taxing authority.37 "We cannot create new rights or confer new pow-
ers. All we can do is to bring existing powers into operation."38 Sec-
ond, if the local government was already taxing at its statutory 
maximum, the Court would not investigate the local budget to iden-
tify unnecessary expenditures to be reallocated for payment of the 
debt.39 The determination of proper and necessary expenditures was 
within the discretion of municipal authorities, and the Court felt it 
had no "right to control that discretion, much less to usurp and su-
persede it."40 
Although distinctions can be drawn between these bond cases 
and school desegregation remedies,41 the reliance on the bond cases 
in the Fourth Circuit dissent to Gr!lfin suggests that their limitations 
City of Galena v. Amy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 705 (1866). C.f. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 
(1883) (eleventh amendment barred suit against state on a bond). The authority to tax under 
state law was crucial in these decisions. If a state statute permitted the municipality to increase 
taxes, the Court was willing to order such an increase to pay bondholders. Indeed, the Court 
encouraged the inclusion of new parties not originally liable for the judgment if they were 
necessary to levy the tax, Labette, 112 U.S. at 224, and was even willing to issue mandamus 
against a newly formed township that had enveloped the governmental functions of the origi-
nal bonding authority, Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906). 
36. See Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U.S. SO (1915); Clay County v. McAleer, 115 U.S. 616 
(1885); Thompson v. Allen County, llS U.S. 550 (1885); United States v. County of Macon, 99 
U.S. 582 (1879); City of Memphis v. United States, 97 U.S. 293 (1878); City of Cleveland v. 
United States, 111 F. 341 (6th Cir. 1901); Weaver v. City of Ogden City, 111 F. 323 (C.C.D. 
Utah 1901). 
37. See City of Cleveland v. United States, ll I F. 341, 343 (6th Cir. 1901). 
38. United States v. County of Macon, 99 U.S. 582, 591 (1879). Eighty years later, the 
Gr!lftn Court faintly echoed the same limitation: "the District Court may ... require the 
Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes .... " Griffin v. County School 
Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (emphasis added). 
39. See Missouri ex rel. Harshman v. Winterbottom, 123, 215 (1887); Clay County v. 
McAleer, 115 U.S. 616 (1885); City ofE. St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, 110 U.S. 321 
(1884); City of Cleveland v. United States, ll l F. 341 (6th Cir. 1901). 
40. City ofE. St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, ll0 U.S. 321, 324 (1884). 
41. The most obvious distinction between the bond cases and the desegregation cases is 
that Virginia v. West Virginia and the later bond cases were actions in contract: no constitu-
tional violation had occurred. Of course, this distinction is tempered somewhat by the consti-
tutional quality that the courts accorded contract rights at the time of these bond cases. See, 
e.g., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728, 746 (1883) (Field, J., and Harlan, J., dissenting). 
Hence, courts at the tum of the century may have used as extensive an equitable remedy in 
defense of contract rights as they would have for any personal constitutional right. But even 
the courts in the bond cases recognized that the complainant bondholders were worthy of only 
limited sympathy: 
While there has undoubtedly been great recklessness on the part of the municipal 
authorities in the creation of bonded indebtedness, there has not unfrequently [sic] been 
gross carelessness on the part of purchasers when investing in such securities. . . . If the 
purchaser in this case had examined the statutes under which the county was acting, he 
would have seen what might prove to be difficulties in the way of payment. 
United States v. County of Macon, 99 U.S. 582, 590 (1879). Clearly there is no comparable 
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on the taxation remedy may have continuing vitality. That vitality 
could well leave a modem federal court groping for an alternative to 
ordering a tax levy. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO ORDERING A TAX LEVY THAT 
EXCEEDS A STATUTORY MAXIMUM 
A fully remedial alternative to the court-ordered tax levy does 
exist: courts may order integration within the existing school bud-
gets, requiring school officials to spend funds for desegregation and 
to decrease expenditures for other school programs. By limiting its 
order to a simple demand for desegregation, the district court would 
leave to state and local authorities the problem of deciding whether 
to increase taxes or to reallocate the budget.42 This proposal offers 
obvious advantages over a court-imposed tax levy. It keeps district 
courts out of the business of raising taxes and administering schools 
while it remedies the constitutional violations. It avoids extreme re-
action to the less invidious cause of the dilemma (tax limitations do 
not inherently frustrate the formation of unitary, nonracial school 
systems43). It protects the paramount role of state and local authori-
ties in designing curricula and administering schools. "No single 
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local con-
trol over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been 
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern 
and support for public schools and to the quality of the educational 
process."44 
Even more important, by shifting funds and cutting back other 
culpability on the part of segregated schoolchildren. Thus, no matter how highly a court may 
value contract rights, an equal protection violation is apt to receive a more aggressive remedy. 
A second theme that may distinguish the bond obligation cases from school desegregation 
is the Supreme Court's evolving view of the eleventh amendment: ''The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. It was not until Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123 (1908), that the Supreme Court established the right of citizens to sue their own state 
for an injunction forbidding prospective enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. See 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). In the bond cases before Young, the 19th-cen-
tury notion of state immunity from suit may have encouraged courts to give co~iderable re-
spect to statutes limiting local taxing authority; a court would be understandably reluctant to 
compel a municipality to violate a statute when the court could not enjoin the state from 
enforcing it against the municipality. In Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U.S. 50 (1915), however, 
Justice Holmes's majority opinion held strictly to the earlier bond precedents that limited taxa-
tion for bond payment to the methods and limitations prescribed by state statute, Young 
notwithstanding. Thus, evolution of the eleventh amendment has not necessarily eliminated 
separate treatment for authorized and unauthorized tax levies. 
42. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (decree directs sheriff to 
finance constitutionally mandated jail improvements from other categories in his approved 
budget). 
43. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,479 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing). 
44. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, at 741-42 (1974). See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 
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programs rather than directly raising taxes, the proposal starkly 
presents the true constitutional and economic choice facing local citi-
zens: given that schools must be integrated, for what calibre of edu-
cation are they willing to pay? The choice is not between segregated 
and desegregated schools; it may be between desegregated schools 
for half days with low taxes and desegregated schools for full days 
with high taxes.45 But once the federal courts assure a desegregated 
system, the proposal leaves the remaining determinations with the 
state and school district. If they prefer a higher standard of educa-
tion than their tax limit permits after desegregation, then their rem-
edy is to raise that limit. And such an allocation of responsibility 
seems harmonious with the federal system. Since state and local au-
thorities have unfettered discretion under the federal Constitution to 
establish the original quality of public education,46 the same discre-
tion should allow citizens to maintain or select a different standard 
433 U.S. 406,420 (1977); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 I U.S. I, 50 (1974); 
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 451, 477-79 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
45. Such a severe decrease in classes could cause an even more severe decrease in state aid 
for the local school system. This is, however, a burden that the state has imposed on its own 
school systems much like a state-imposed tax limitation. If conditions under either type of 
restriction become catastrophic, the state electorate can remedy the difficulty if it so desires, 
46. Several cases have held that desegregation may not cause a reduction in educational 
quality or a discontinuance of any courses, services, or extracurricular activities offered by the 
schools before desegregation. See Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 
817,831 (5th Cir. 1969); Bradley v. School Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828,846 (E.D. Va. 1971). But see 
Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 946-48 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). How-
ever, such holdings arise where local authorities have actively fostered a private, white school 
system by degrading the public schools. See note 27 supra. In such situations, the cutbacks in 
public education were part of a scheme to avoid constitutionally required desegregation. They 
conflicted with the school board's affirmative duty under the remedial order to create a unitary 
school district. Absent such devious motives to impede desegregation, however, a school cut-
back would probably be found constitutionally permissible. 
In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the city of Jackson, Mississippi, had closed its 
swimming pools following a court order that all park facilities be desegregated. The city de-
segregated its parks, zoo, auditoriums, and golf courses, but closed the pools because, accord-
ing to the findings of the district court, the city concluded that the pools could not be operated 
peaceably and economically on an integrated basis, 403 U.S. at 219. A divided Supreme Court 
permitted the closing, holding that it need not examine the possible racial motivations of the 
city when the effect of the closing was neutral to both blacks and whites and when permissible 
legislative concerns such as preserving the public peace and purse may have been the actual 
motive, 403 U.S. at 224-25. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA w § 16-17 
(1978), . 
Later Supreme Court cases state that discriminatory intent is needed to violate equal pro-
tection even if the actual effect on the races is not equal. In Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court stated that proof of discrimina-
tory intent is required to show a denial of equal protection. 429 U.S. at 265. Washington v, 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), decided a year before Arlington Heights, reached the same conclu-
sion, stressing that neutrality in a statute's application between black and white citizens 
weighed heavily against unconstitutionality. See 426 U.S. at 246-48. 
A school cutback to fund desegregation appears constitutional whether the court uses an 
intent or an effect standard. Under the effect standard, the cutback will apply equally to black 
and white students and certainly be less suspect than the pool closing in Palmer. If, however, a 
court requires a finding of discriminatory intent, as in the more recent cases of Washington and 
Arlington Heights, a school cutback still withstands constitutional attack since it would be part 
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of education following tax limitation and desegregation.47 
As appealing as this proposal appears, it can be fully acceptable 
only if it satisfies the three equitable principles of Milliken.48 The 
remainder of this Section renews attention to those principles, ex-
ploring the tension that tax limitation can create among them. It 
seeks to demonstrate that a blunt desegregation order satisfies those 
principles and resolves their internal tension in a more appealing 
manner than does a court-ordered tax levy. 
A. Tension Among the Equitable Principles 
This Note's proposal satisfies the second principle - that the ex-
tent of the remedy should be determined by the nature and scope of 
the constitutional violation49 - rather easily. Indeed, it seems to be 
a better fitting remedy than a court-ordered tax levy. Since segrega-
tion typically arises from discriminatory school districting plans and 
not from the local government's tax rate, state and local tax struc-
tures would appear to be beyond the scope of the constitutional vio-
lation. 50 
More intricate is the question of how the proposal reconciles an 
inevitable tension between the first and third principles - between 
the commands that victims of discrimination be restored as nearly as 
possible "to the position they would have occupied in the absence of 
of a desegregative remedy fashioned to meet the school district's taxing limitations rather than 
to promote segregation. 
This Note's alternative to ordering a tax levy in excess of a state tax ceiling therefore seems 
to satisfy equal protection. But is it possible that the cutbacks could be so extensive that they 
abridge constitutional rights to education? The Supreme Court has not accepted any theory of 
a constitutionally mandated quantum of education. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), upholding Texas's property-tax system of school funding, the 
majority opinion expressed severe doubt that a constitutional right to education exists. The 
Court observed that even if some identifiable quantity of education were constitutionally re-
quired, it would be limited to "an opportunity to acquire basic minimal skills necessary for the 
enjoyment of the rights of speech and offull participation in the political process." 411 U.S. at 
36. Thus, unless performed to frustrate the establishment of a nonracial school system, a 
school program cutback would be constitutional. 
47. Giving the public the opportunity to accept a lesser educational program or to raise the 
tax ceiling is also consistent with the cases confronting unconstitutional conditions in prisons 
and asylums. Courts generally address such cases from the view that if the state chooses to 
operate the institutions, it must maintain them at constitutional standards. See Wyatt v. 
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. 
Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Holt 
v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
Perhaps public distaste for freeing asylum and prison inmates explains the less activist 
approach that courts have taken to ordering jail improvements; the threat of release may pro-
vide sufficient motivation for expenditures without judicial decree. See Hamilton v. Love, 328 
F. Supp. at 1194; Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
48. See the discussion of these principles in notes 11-21 supra and accompanying text. 
49. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977). 
50. Of course, if the tax limitation itself were unconstitutional, it would be void on in-
dependent grounds. 
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such conduct"51 and that courts consider the interests of state and 
local governments in managing their own affairs.52 The proposal 
certainly seems solicitous of local interests; at first glance, one could 
hardly accuse it of breaching the third princjple. A decree directing 
local authorities to desegregate without stipulating precisely how to 
do it respects concerns for federalism far more than a court-ordered 
tax levy. But it may require a reallocation of funds that reduces the 
quality of education for all students, black and white. Once a school 
board has, for example, unconstitutionally constructed schools in a 
discriminatory fashion,53 that misallocation of buildings may make 
it more expensive to operate a nonracial system than it would have 
been had the discriminatory construction never occurred. Even 
without such a misallocation of schools, the costs of transporting stu-
dents across the city to integrate schools may cause the discontinu-
ance of school orchestras, track teams, or advanced chemistry 
classes. The victims of school segregation may not be fully restored 
"to the position they would have occupied in the absence of' dis-
crimination. 
This conflict between full restoration and federalism is not easily 
resolved. Determining where the plaintiffs in a desegregation case 
might have been had there been no discrimination involves consider-
able guesswork. School systems are not static, and a district court 
cannot know precisely what a school system would be like had invid-
ious discrimination not been shaping decisions for ten or twenty 
years. 
It may have been in recognition of this uncertainty that the 
Supreme Court originally stressed the broad flexibility of equitable 
remedies in .Brown - the "facility for adjusting and reconciling pub-
lic and private needs."54 The public needs at stake where a district 
court must reconcile a desegregation order and a tax ceiling include 
public concerns for federalism55 - the balance of power between 
51. 433 U.S. at 280 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)). 
52. 433 U.S. at 280-81. 
53. A common segregative technique in northern cities is to construct smaller schools, tai-
lored to small, racially identifiable neighborhoods. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. l, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973). See generally Binion, Racial Discrimination by Alteration or Refusal to Alter School 
District Boundaries, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 811 (1977); Orfield, Federal Policy, Local Power, and 
Metropolitan Segregation, 89 PoL. Ser. Q. 777, 790 (1974). 
54. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). 
55. The strongest reminder of the vitality of federalism is National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which overturned a federal statute extending minimum wage and 
maximum hour requirements to all employees of the states and their political subdivisions, 
The Court hinted that the statute offended state sovereignty under the tenth amendment, 426 
U.S. at 842-43, and held that it "impermissibly interfer[ed] with the integral governmental 
functions of [state and local governments]." 426 U.S. at 851. Because National League of 
Cities involved a federal statute under the commerce clause rather than a remedial decree for a 
constitutional violation, its reasoning is not directly applicable to the issue of federalism and 
remedial taxation. The Court's distaste for federal acts that "overwhelm state fiscal policy," 
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state and national governments.56 Accordingly, to resolve the con-
flict between the principle of full restoration and the principle of fed-
eralism, one must ask whether, under Milliken, an equitable remedy 
for discrimination may fall short of fully compensating the victims in 
an effort to maintain the balance of federal-state relations. To pose 
the question slightly differently, does federalism require that some 
desegregation decrees be less than fully compensatory? This Note 
will conclude that it does so require where complete desegregation 
can be obtained within state-permitted tax rates, and where addi-
tional :funds are necessary only to raise the quality of the curriculum 
to meet the trial judge's estimation of what the schools would have 
been like absent segregation. 
Two themes in modem cases lead to this conclusion: (1) the judi-
cial reluctance to circumvent state statutes if the circumvention is 
unnecessary to remedy the constitutional violation, and (2) the will-
ingness of the Supreme Court to permit some individual rights to 
suffer in order to preserve the balance of federalism. 
B. Judicial Respect for State Law 
The first theme manifests itself in the funding section of school 
desegregation decrees: The funding order is often a vaguely worded 
requirement that the defendants "who have such power . . . request 
[,] . . . raise and appropriate all funds requisite for the operation of 
the . . . school system in full compliance with the terms" of the spe-
cific order,57 Other courts avoid the funding issue by branding it 
"premature," using the mere incantation of the Gr!lfin taxation rem-
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,203 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), however, remains signifi-
cant. Although scholars have construed National League of Cities in a myriad of ways, see, 
e.g., Michelman, States' Rights and Stales' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of 
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights lo Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 1065 (1977), the practical interpretation of the case is that the Court felt Congress had 
overstepped an intuitive balance in federal-state relations. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW§ 5-22 (1978). See also w. BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM, 
210-11 (1964). Such an intuitive limit upon federal involvement in state affairs might well 
come into play as a judge assesses a proposed decree levying a tax in excess of a state tax 
ceiling. Indeed, the Supreme Court has avoided interfering with rights created by the states on 
grounds of federalism and comity. Buford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943). 
56. A tax limitation's embodiment in a state constitution or referendum is not apt to alter 
the courts' analysis; the Supreme Court has overturned both types of state laws, pausing only 
to comment that their form or popularity has no bearing on their constitutionality. See, e.g., 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 379-81 (1967); Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 
713, 727-28 (1964). See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 
(1943). 
57. Bradley v. School Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828, 847 (E.D. Va. 1971). See also Brewer v. 
School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1969), affd., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Plaquemines 
Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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edy as a threat to the local authorities.58 Thus, local tax and ex-
penditure laws, unrelated to the constitutional violation, remain 
untouched by the decree. 59 
The Eighth Circuit has discussed the relationship between state 
law and equitable remedies in school desegregation cases, but it has 
drawn no express distinction between those state laws that must be 
circumvented to remedy the constitutional violation and those that 
could be left undisturbed by the decree. In Haney v. County .Board of 
Education,60 an Arkansas statute provided that annexation was the 
only permissible way to combine two separate school districts.61 The 
plaintiffs in Haney requested that two districts be united by means of 
consolidation, which would have provided greater administrative 
equality for the smaller, black district. Instead, the district court pro-
ceeded under the statute and annexed the black district to the larger 
one.62 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's deci-
sion to abide by the state annexation statute. Although the appellate 
court observed that the "remedial power of the federal courts under 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited by state law" when that 
law fails to provide a nonracial school system, 63 it nevertheless held 
that annexation was as successful in achieving that goal as consolida-
tion. On the other hand, the court did object to the state-mandated 
procedure for creating the new school board, which e.ff ectively left 
all five white members in office for up to four years and gave only 
58. E.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 
(1977); Pettaway v. County School Bd., 230 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1964). In Wyatt v. 
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), the court found that conditions in a state mental 
institution violated minimum constitutional standards and observed: 
[We] regard as premature any issue as to whether the district court should appoint a 
Special Master for the purposes of selling or encumbering state lands to finance these 
standards, or should enjoin certain state officials from authorizing expenditures for nones-
sential state functions, and thereby alter the state budget or by other means order a partic-
ular mode of financing the implementation of the stipulated standards. 
503 F.2d at 1317. 
59. The district court may, however, enjoin the withholding of previously appropriated 
funds as a device to elude desegregation. In James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va.), 
qjfd., 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959), the city council of Norfolk, 
Virginia, voted to withdraw previously approved funding for all schools above the sixth grade 
to avoid desegregation. The district court enjoined that withholding of funds. In affirming, 
the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the city council's earlier allocation of the funds; it was 
unnecessary to compel funding for the schools directly since enjoining the later resolution 
withholding funds accomplished the same result. James v. Duckworth, 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). This distinction is hardly a satisfying one, but it reflects 
concerns for "the interest of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs," Milli-
ken II, 433 U.S. 267, 289-81 (1977), and a desire to minimize interference in funding proce-
dures. 
60. 429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970). 
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-4601 to 4614 (1969 Supp.). 
62. Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 284 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ark.), revd. in part, 429 F.2d 
364 (8th Cir. 1970). 
63. 429 F.2d at 368. 
February 1980] Note - .Desegregation Remedies 601 
three short-term seats to representatives of the black school district. 
The court found that the statute mandating such an allocation vio-
lated the equal protection clause and accordingly reversed the dis-
trict court's approval of the school board representation procedure.64 
Despite the strong assertion of equitable powers in Haney, it is 
hardly clear that its reasoning extends to state tax ceilings. Haney 
merely overturned a statute compelling appointment of a racially 
unbalanced school board. Discriminatory application of such 
facially neutral state school provisions is often the taproot of a con-
stitutional violation.65 Surely the network of school regulations that 
led to a constitutional violation cannot command great respect from 
a court seeking to remedy that violation. Indeed, to require obedi-
ence to all school statutes would straitjacket the federal courts from 
successfully remedying discrimination; the only way the court in Ha-
ney could give the black district equal representation on the school 
board was to circumvent the state-required procedure. 
Sidestepping a state limitation upon local taxing authority, how-
ever, is another matter. In modern desegregation cases, abuse of tax-
ation powers is rarely the basis for a constitutional violation. A 
desire to thwart desegregation is not the inspiration for tax limitation 
measures; such ceilings generally apply equally to all expenditures of 
local government and are independent of the provisions that authori-
ties use or misuse to discriminate against minority students. More-
over, the tax limitation itself does not compel discrimination; rather, 
it merely restricts the options of the district court in designing its 
equitable remedy. Few would argue that a court should order a non-
discriminatory state teachers' college to double its admissions be-
cause more teachers are needed in a nearby school district 
undergoing desegregation. Although such a change might eventu-
ally assist the desegregation remedy, the college lies beyond the 
scope of the constitutional violation and accordingly should be be-
yond the reach of the court's equitable powers.66 Likewise, although 
circumvention of the state tax limitation may provide a more elegant 
remedial decree, the court's equitable powers should not extend that 
far if another remedy would alleviate the constitutional violations 
while sparing the state law.67 
64. 429 F.2d at 369. The Eighth Circuit relied principally upon Louisiana v. United States, 
380 U.S. 145 (1965), for its statement that state law did not restrict remedies of fourteenth 
amendment violations. 429 F.2d at 368. Like Haney, however, the Court in Louisiana found 
the state statute itself unconstitutional. Thus, neither case gives a district court clear authority 
to ignore state law that, though constitutional in application, forces the equitable decree to 
follow one remedial course rather than another. 
65. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
66. This argument is nothing more than a restatement of the second equitable principle of 
desegregation, discussed in the text at notes 16-20 supra. 
67. See note 88 iefra. 
602 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:587 
United States v. Missouri68 gave the Eighth Circuit an opportu-
nity to clarify Haney and the relationship between a desegregation 
decree and a conflic;ting state law - specifically, a state tax limita-
tion. The district court had ordered a merger of three school districts 
as a remedy for state-enforced segregation.69 It heard evidence and 
found that the tax rate necessary to finance the desegregated opera-
tion of a unified district would have to be higher than the previous 
rates in any of the three districts.70 The Missouri Constitution re-
quires that a two-thirds majority of the local citizens approve a 
school district's tax levy.71 Nevertheless, the district court recog-
nized that such approval was unlikely in the aftermath of a desegre-
gation order72 and simply imposed the higher tax rate without 
referendum. 73 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit seemed much less eager to ignore 
state taxation law than it had been to interfere with school board 
representation law in Haney. After firmly restating its dictum from 
Haney that state law did not constrain the equitable remedies of fed-
eral courts,74 the circuit court nonetheless proceeded to review the 
Missouri law governing tax rates after annexation.75 Without decid-
ing which rate would apply under state law, the court found a less 
offensive method than the district court to resolve the dispute. The 
local school board had asked the district court to amend its decree 
and lower the tax rate to that of the highest of the three old school 
districts.76 The lower court had refused, asserting that the new dis-
trict should not begin operations with a deficit budget.77 Stating that 
"[m]aximum consideration should be given the views of the state and 
68. 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975). 
69. United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo.), modified, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th 
Cir. 1975). 
70. 388 F. Supp. at 1059. See 515 F.2d at 1371. 
71. Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 1 l(c). 
72. 388 F. Supp. at 1059. 
73. 388 F. Supp. at 1060. 
74. United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d at 1372. 
75. 515 F.2d at 1372 nn.7 & 8. Unfortunately, Missouri law governing tax rates after dis-
trict annexation was anything but clear. Missouri v. Conley, 485 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1972), 
held that the existing tax rate in each district continued to apply after annexation, but the case 
did not deal with an annexation caused by judicial decree. See Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 162.441 
(Vernon 1965) (amended 1973). Several earlier opinions of the Missouri Attorney General 
had held that the voter-approved levy of the annexing district would apply to the annexed 
territory. See OP. Mo. ATTY. GEN. No. 362 (1969). Supporting this view, the state constitu-
tion required that uniform taxes be levied throughout the territorial limits of the levying au-
thority. Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 3. Thus, although state precedents conflicted as to which rate 
should apply, they clearly indicated that a rate no higher than that of the annexing district 
could be levied without voter approval. 
76. Also, the State Board of Education had moved to amend the judgment, arguing that 
sufficient state and federal funds would be available to maintain the district at a tax rate con• 
sistent with Missouri law. 
77. 515 F.2d at 1372. 
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local officials concerned," the Eighth Circuit remanded that portion 
of the district court's decree.78 It held that the school board's request 
should have been granted, thereby establishing the highest original, 
voter-approved levy as the rate for the new district. In its conclu-
sion, the court remarked that the maximum tax rate "shall be no 
higher than that of the annexing district,"79 clearly echoing the view 
of Missouri law expressed in the attorney general's opinions.80 The 
Eighth Circuit thus achieved a result that was arguably consistent 
with a state taxation law and escaped the need to reexamine its dic-
tum in Haney or the actual relationship between remedial equity 
powers and state tax limitations. 
The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the issue of 
which state laws a court may override in formulating a desegregation 
decree. But in voter rights and reapportionment cases,81 the Court 
has reversed several remedial decrees that had circumvented more 
state law than was necessary to remedy the constitutional violation. 82 
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 83 for example, the Court upheld statewide 
redistricting but reversed the district court's elimination of multi-
member districts that the legislature had distributed through the 
state for political ends.84 And in Sixty-Seventh State Senate v. 
Beens,85 the district court's decree had not only reapportioned, but 
also reduced the membership of the state's House of Representatives 
78. 515 F.2d at 1373. 
79. 515 F.2d at 1373 (emphasis added). 
SO. See note 75 supra. 
81. The analogy to voter rights and reapportionment cases is appropriate because they 
provided the major impetus for.the activism of federal courts in handling civil rights violations 
by state and local authorities. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 79. Accord, Dell'Ario, Remedies 
far School Desegregation: A Limit on the Equity Power ef the Federal Courts?, 2 HASTINGS 
CONST. L. Q. l 13, 142 (1975). 
82. Following the early reapportionment cases (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)), federal courts used a wide variety of equitable remedies to 
correct constitutionally infirm districting or election procedures. See Louisiana v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (voters completely reregistered); Rader v. Cliburn, 476 F.2d 182 
(6th Cir. 1973) (terms of office changed); Montana v. Lee, 384 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1967) (alder-
manic districts abolished and all elected at large); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 
1967) (election invalidated); Reynolds v. State Election Bd., 233 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Okla. 
1964) (all state legislators removed from office); Staff, Federal Invalidation as a Remedy for 
Irregularities in State Elections, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1092 (1974). 
83. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
84. Similarly, in White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973), the district court chose one of three 
alternative redistricting plans because it provided the most compact and least gerrymandered 
districts, even though it was not quite as effective at equalizing the population among the 
districts as one of the other plans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court 
should have chosen the plan subinitted by the state which, although politically motivated, 
allocated voters more equally. It concluded that district courts should defer to state policy 
when fashioning relief unless that state policy is subject to constitutional challenge, and the 
Court found no such vulnerability in legislative policy designed to preserve the constituencies 
of incumbent congressmen. 412 U.S. at 797. See also Ferrell v. Oklahoma ex rel. Hall, 339 F. 
Supp. 73 (W.D. Okla.), qffd mem., 406 U.S_. 939 (1972). 
85. 406 U.S. 187 (1972). 
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by one fourth and the Senate by one half. The Supreme Court 
would have had no difficulty with a "court-imposed minor variation 
from a State's prescribed figure when that change is shown to be 
necessary to meet constitutional requirements,"86 but it found the 
unnecessarily drastic change in size a violation of the lower court's 
equity powers. 87 
Thus, the reapportionment cases recognize a distinction between 
those state laws that must be circumvented to effect a remedial de-
cree and those that need not. Although the Eighth Circuit did not 
expressly adopt such a distinction for desegregation cases, the result 
in United States v. Missouri suggests that similar reasoning may have 
been at work. 
C. Judicial .Deference to Federalism 
The second theme supporting this Note's conclusion is the occa-
sional willingness of the Supreme Court to sacrifice individual rights 
for federalism values.88 The school desegregation cases themselves 
demonstrate such a trade-off. In the seminal case assessing a school 
desegregation remedy, .Brown II,89 the Supreme Court exhibited re-
straint in its equitable directives that can only be attributed to feder-
alism concerns. Rather than ordering immediate dismantling of the 
segregated school systems, which would have instantly remedied the 
constitutional harm, the Court directed that the dual systems be dis-
mantled "with all deliberate speed."90 This infamous phrase was a 
product of judicial restraint; previous desegregation cases had estab-
lished the Court's power to require immediate relie£91 Moreover, 
the Court not only delayed complete implementation, it also rather 
surprisingly entrusted primary responsibility for desegregating 
schools to the local school boards, the very parties found liable for 
intentional discrimination.92 
86. 406 U.S. at 199. 
87. 406 U.S. at 20. 
88. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 20i (1973) ("federalism requires that fed-
eral injunctions ... be shaped with concern and care for the responsibilities of ... state 
governments"). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 239 (1973) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 15-16 (1971). 
89. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
90. 349 U.S. at 301. 
91. Immediate rectification of unconstitutional discrimination had been the consistent 
practice before Brown II. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) 
(blacks granted access to all university facilities); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (ad-
mission to all-white law school); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (same); Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (same). Following Brown II, the Court continued to issue orders 
for immediate desegregation of noneducational facilities. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 
333 (1968) (prison facilities); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1958) (buses); New Orleans City 
Park Impvt. Assn., 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf 
courses). 
92. 349 U.S. at 299. 
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The Supreme Court's deference to principles of federalism has 
extended beyond school desegregation cases. In Reynolds v. Sims,93 
for example, the Court recognized certain legitimate state interests in 
reapportionment. It held that reapportioned legislative districts may 
deviate from perfect population equality if the lines follow bounda-
ries of an existing political subdivision. Since the state accords these 
subdivisions independent political authority, it may also grant them 
independent legislative representation.94 The Court directed district 
courts, in formulating remedies, to consider the imminency of a new 
election, the complexity of state election processes, and whether the 
remedy might impose "embarrassing demands" upon a state.95 The 
influence of federalism upon the Court's decision in Sims is evident 
when one compares those state reapportionment principles to the 
Court's treatment of federal congressional districts. Absolute repre-
sentational equality is the standard for congressional apportion-
ment.96 For state legislative districts, however, the Court has 
allowed population deviations of 16 percent, where the variance pre-
serves the integrity of local political boundaries.97 The Court thus 
sacrifices representational equality - and individual rights of repre-
sentation - out of respect for the states' internal government. 
Judicial abstention, typified by Younger v. Harris,98 is another 
Supreme Court doctrine that sacrifices vindication of individual 
rights for the sake of federalism. Under that doctrine, a defendant in 
a state criminal trial, as well as in some civil trials where the state is 
the plaintiff,99 cannot obtain a federal court injunction to halt the 
state proceeding on grounds of state violation of federal constitu-
tional rights. Absent a significant threat of irreparable injury, the 
defendant must pursue any federal rights through state appellate 
channels, ultimately appealing to the Supreme Court if necessary.100 
The "vital consideration" supporting this doctrine is federalism: 
"the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate 
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to 
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activ-
ities of the State."101 Thus, if the state trial court misunderstands the 
federal rights involved, a defendant may have to endure a criminal 
prosecution under a statute that is unconstitutional on its face102 or 
93. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
94. 377 U.S. at 580-81. 
95. 377 U.S. at 585. 
96. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
97. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973). 
98. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
99. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 
(1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
100. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). 
101. 401 U.S. at 44. 
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supported py an unconstitutional search. 103 Respect for state institu-
tions rests as the cornerstone of this doctrine restricting the protec-
tion of civil rights. 104 
Surely the power of a state's citizens to establish a maximum tax-
ing authority deserves as much respect by a federal court as does the 
design of a state's political boundaries or the operation of a state's 
trials. The ultimate inquiry is whether the costs of federal rejection 
of a state taxation limit outweigh the costs of a decree's failure to 
place the victims of discrimination precisely where the court guesses 
they would have been absent the discrimination. 105 The cases in 
which the Supreme Court has considered the effect of federalism 
upon remedial decrees suggest that the scales tip against a district 
court decree that would unnecessarily override a state tax limita-
tion.106 
CONCLUSION 
The resolution this Note proposes for the clash between desegre-
gation and tax limitation is an ugly one. But when a school district is 
without funds, without authority to raise taxes, and under an expen-
sive affirmative duty to desegregate, there are no pretty options. 107 
This Note's proposal - to order school authorities to cut programs 
as necessary to fund desegregation rather than impose a state-pro-
hibited tax - recognizes a school district's constitutional duty to 
remedy discrimination as well as the right of state and local govern-
102. See 401 U.S. at 54. 
103. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). One of the few exceptions to Younger 
abstention in criminal trials is bad faith harassment by state officials. See Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). q. Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977) (repeated prosecutions and threatened future prosecutions under unconsti-
tutional statute warrant wholly prospective injunctive relief). 
104. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 
334-36 (1977). 
105. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 240 n.19 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part) (quoting Comment, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government Respon-
sibility, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 422 (1972)); Fiss, supra note 6, at 195-96. 
106. One case that might suggest a different conclusion, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 
(1976), did not involve a direct collision of federal and state governmental entities. Although 
the Court upheld the plaintiffs' request for an order spanning local political boundaries, no 
political unit of the state of Illinois was a party in Hills; the order was directed solely to the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 425 U.S. at 296. The Court noted that the 
Chicago Housing Authority, the agency the federal funds were to flow through, had power 
under state law to operate beyond city limits. 425 U.S. at 298 n.14. 
107. Commentators have offered other awkward answers to this difficulty, ones more dis-
quieting from a sociological standpoint. Perhaps the directives of Brown v. Board of Education 
cannot and should not be expected to solve all aspects of the problems of segregated education. 
See Read, supra note 2, at 48-49. The answers, however, may require altered assumptions 
about local control of education and federalism that will come not from the courts, but from 
the political process. See Orfield, supra note 53, at 802. For a thoughtful judicial appraisal of 
this central issue, see Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 
443 U.S. 449, 479 (1979). · 
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ments to establish tax levies and school budgets. Were a district 
court to levy a tax in excess of a locality's authority, the order would 
rest on precedent of questionable applicability, interfere with the 
federal system in a manner unnecessary to fulfill the mandate of 
equal protection, and confiscate the responsibility of determining ed-
ucational standards that has rationally and constitutionally rested 
with local citizens. 
